From 56fc82c5360cdf0b250b5eb74f38657b0402faa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2009 00:48:02 +0900 Subject: modpost: NOBITS sections may point beyond the end of the file Impact: fix link failure on certain toolchains with specific configs Recent percpu change made x86_64 split .data.init section into three separate segments - data.init, percpu and data.init2. data.init2 gets .data.nosave and .bss.* and is followed by .notes segment. Depending on configuration both segments might contain no data, in which case the tool chain makes the section header to contain offset beyond the end of the file. modpost isn't too happy about it and fails build - as reported by Pawel Dziekonski: Building modules, stage 2. MODPOST 416 modules FATAL: vmlinux is truncated. sechdrs[i].sh_offset=10354688 > sizeof(*hrd)=64 make[1]: *** [__modpost] Error 1 Teach modpost that NOBITS section may point beyond the end of the file and that .modinfo can't be NOBITS. Reported-by: Pawel Dziekonski Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'scripts') diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 88921611b22e..7e62303133dc 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -415,8 +415,9 @@ static int parse_elf(struct elf_info *info, const char *filename) const char *secstrings = (void *)hdr + sechdrs[hdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset; const char *secname; + int nobits = sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_NOBITS; - if (sechdrs[i].sh_offset > info->size) { + if (!nobits && sechdrs[i].sh_offset > info->size) { fatal("%s is truncated. sechdrs[i].sh_offset=%lu > " "sizeof(*hrd)=%zu\n", filename, (unsigned long)sechdrs[i].sh_offset, @@ -425,6 +426,8 @@ static int parse_elf(struct elf_info *info, const char *filename) } secname = secstrings + sechdrs[i].sh_name; if (strcmp(secname, ".modinfo") == 0) { + if (nobits) + fatal("%s has NOBITS .modinfo\n", filename); info->modinfo = (void *)hdr + sechdrs[i].sh_offset; info->modinfo_len = sechdrs[i].sh_size; } else if (strcmp(secname, "__ksymtab") == 0) -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 5d707e9c8ef2a3596ed5c975c6ff05cec890c2b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 22:17:39 +0900 Subject: stackprotector: update make rules Impact: no default -fno-stack-protector if stackp is enabled, cleanup Stackprotector make rules had the following problems. * cc support test and warning are scattered across makefile and kernel/panic.c. * -fno-stack-protector was always added regardless of configuration. Update such that cc support test and warning are contained in makefile and -fno-stack-protector is added iff stackp is turned off. While at it, prepare for 32bit support. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- Makefile | 3 ++- arch/x86/Makefile | 17 ++++++++++------- kernel/panic.c | 4 ---- scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'scripts') diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 681c1d23b4d4..77a006dae2da 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -532,8 +532,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN}) endif # Force gcc to behave correct even for buggy distributions -# Arch Makefiles may override this setting +ifndef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) +endif ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index cacee981d166..ab48ab497e5a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -70,14 +70,17 @@ else # this works around some issues with generating unwind tables in older gccs # newer gccs do it by default KBUILD_CFLAGS += -maccumulate-outgoing-args +endif - stackp := $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh - stackp-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) := $(shell $(stackp) \ - "$(CC)" "-fstack-protector -DGCC_HAS_SP" ) - stackp-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL) += $(shell $(stackp) \ - "$(CC)" -fstack-protector-all ) - - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-y) +ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + cc_has_sp := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh + ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC)),y) + stackp-y := -fstack-protector + stackp-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL) += -fstack-protector-all + KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-y) + else + $(warning stack protector enabled but no compiler support) + endif endif # Stackpointer is addressed different for 32 bit and 64 bit x86 diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 33cab3de1763..32fe4eff1b89 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -359,10 +359,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR -#ifndef GCC_HAS_SP -#warning You have selected the CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR option, but the gcc used does not support this. -#endif - /* * Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and * gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value diff --git a/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh b/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh index 325c0a1b03b6..2d69fcdc5609 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh +++ b/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh @@ -2,5 +2,7 @@ echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $1 -S -xc -c -O0 -mcmodel=kernel -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs" if [ "$?" -eq "0" ] ; then - echo $2 + echo y +else + echo n fi -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 60a5317ff0f42dd313094b88f809f63041568b08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 22:17:40 +0900 Subject: x86: implement x86_32 stack protector Impact: stack protector for x86_32 Implement stack protector for x86_32. GDT entry 28 is used for it. It's set to point to stack_canary-20 and have the length of 24 bytes. CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR turns off CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and sets %gs to the stack canary segment on entry. As %gs is otherwise unused by the kernel, the canary can be anywhere. It's defined as a percpu variable. x86_32 exception handlers take register frame on stack directly as struct pt_regs. With -fstack-protector turned on, gcc copies the whole structure after the stack canary and (of course) doesn't copy back on return thus losing all changed. For now, -fno-stack-protector is added to all files which contain those functions. We definitely need something better. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h | 9 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/system.h | 21 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 18 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 17 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 20 ++++++- arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c | 2 + scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh | 8 +++ 12 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh (limited to 'scripts') diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 5bcdede71ba4..f760a22f95dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ config X86_TRAMPOLINE config X86_32_LAZY_GS def_bool y - depends on X86_32 + depends on X86_32 && !CC_STACKPROTECTOR config KTIME_SCALAR def_bool X86_32 @@ -1356,7 +1356,6 @@ config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL config CC_STACKPROTECTOR bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on X86_64 select CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL help This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 9763eb700138..5a9472104253 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -396,7 +396,11 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(union irq_stack_union, irq_stack_union); DECLARE_INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_union); DECLARE_PER_CPU(char *, irq_stack_ptr); +#else /* X86_64 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR +DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, stack_canary); #endif +#endif /* X86_64 */ extern void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *); extern unsigned int xstate_size; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h index 1dc1b51ac623..14e0ed86a6f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ * * 26 - ESPFIX small SS * 27 - per-cpu [ offset to per-cpu data area ] - * 28 - unused + * 28 - stack_canary-20 [ for stack protector ] * 29 - unused * 30 - unused * 31 - TSS for double fault handler @@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ #define __KERNEL_PERCPU 0 #endif +#define GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY (GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_BASE + 16) +#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR +#define __KERNEL_STACK_CANARY (GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY * 8) +#else +#define __KERNEL_STACK_CANARY 0 +#endif + #define GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS 31 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h index ee275e9f48ab..fa7e5bd6fbe8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -1,3 +1,35 @@ +/* + * GCC stack protector support. + * + * Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of + * the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when + * returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary + * and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs. + * On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes. x86_64 + * and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this + * requirement differently. + * + * On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary. All + * percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu + * area. The first occupant of the percpu area is always + * irq_stack_union which contains stack_canary at offset 40. Userland + * %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using + * swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there. + * + * On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated. As in x86_64, %gs is + * used for userland TLS. Unfortunately, some processors are much + * slower at loading segment registers with different value when + * entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu + * area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when + * necessary, usually during task switch. + * + * As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed + * lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and + * restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit. This behavior is + * controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in + * system.h to hide the details. + */ + #ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H #define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 @@ -6,8 +38,18 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include +/* + * 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary. Linker + * can't handle the address bit shifting. Address will be set in + * head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others. + */ +#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT \ + [GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = { { { 0x00000018, 0x00409000 } } }, + /* * Initialize the stackprotector canary value. * @@ -19,12 +61,9 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) u64 canary; u64 tsc; - /* - * Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at - * offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement - */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) != 40); - +#endif /* * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, @@ -36,7 +75,49 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); current->stack_canary = canary; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 percpu_write(irq_stack_union.stack_canary, canary); +#else + percpu_write(stack_canary, canary); +#endif +} + +static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu); + struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu); + struct desc_struct desc; + + desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY]; + desc.base0 = canary & 0xffff; + desc.base1 = (canary >> 16) & 0xff; + desc.base2 = (canary >> 24) & 0xff; + write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S); +#endif +} + +static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory"); +#endif +} + +#else /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */ + +#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT + +/* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */ + +static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) +{ } + +static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0)); +#endif } #endif /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h index 79b98e5b96f4..2692ee8ef031 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h @@ -23,6 +23,22 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR +#define __switch_canary \ + "movl "__percpu_arg([current_task])",%%ebx\n\t" \ + "movl %P[task_canary](%%ebx),%%ebx\n\t" \ + "movl %%ebx,"__percpu_arg([stack_canary])"\n\t" +#define __switch_canary_oparam \ + , [stack_canary] "=m" (per_cpu_var(stack_canary)) +#define __switch_canary_iparam \ + , [current_task] "m" (per_cpu_var(current_task)) \ + , [task_canary] "i" (offsetof(struct task_struct, stack_canary)) +#else /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */ +#define __switch_canary +#define __switch_canary_oparam +#define __switch_canary_iparam +#endif /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */ + /* * Saving eflags is important. It switches not only IOPL between tasks, * it also protects other tasks from NT leaking through sysenter etc. @@ -46,6 +62,7 @@ do { \ "pushl %[next_ip]\n\t" /* restore EIP */ \ "jmp __switch_to\n" /* regparm call */ \ "1:\t" \ + __switch_canary \ "popl %%ebp\n\t" /* restore EBP */ \ "popfl\n" /* restore flags */ \ \ @@ -58,6 +75,8 @@ do { \ "=b" (ebx), "=c" (ecx), "=d" (edx), \ "=S" (esi), "=D" (edi) \ \ + __switch_canary_oparam \ + \ /* input parameters: */ \ : [next_sp] "m" (next->thread.sp), \ [next_ip] "m" (next->thread.ip), \ @@ -66,6 +85,8 @@ do { \ [prev] "a" (prev), \ [next] "d" (next) \ \ + __switch_canary_iparam \ + \ : /* reloaded segment registers */ \ "memory"); \ } while (0) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 37fa30bada17..b1f8be33300d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -24,6 +24,24 @@ CFLAGS_vsyscall_64.o := $(PROFILING) -g0 $(nostackp) CFLAGS_hpet.o := $(nostackp) CFLAGS_tsc.o := $(nostackp) CFLAGS_paravirt.o := $(nostackp) +# +# On x86_32, register frame is passed verbatim on stack as struct +# pt_regs. gcc considers the parameter to belong to the callee and +# with -fstack-protector it copies pt_regs to the callee's stack frame +# to put the structure after the stack canary causing changes made by +# the exception handlers to be lost. Turn off stack protector for all +# files containing functions which take struct pt_regs from register +# frame. +# +# The proper way to fix this is to teach gcc that the argument belongs +# to the caller for these functions, oh well... +# +ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +CFLAGS_process_32.o := $(nostackp) +CFLAGS_vm86_32.o := $(nostackp) +CFLAGS_signal.o := $(nostackp) +CFLAGS_traps.o := $(nostackp) +endif obj-y := process_$(BITS).o signal.o entry_$(BITS).o obj-y += traps.o irq.o irq_$(BITS).o dumpstack_$(BITS).o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 41b0de6df873..260fe4cb2c82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "cpu.h" @@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct gdt_page, gdt_page) = { .gdt = { [GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = { { { 0x00000000, 0x00c09200 } } }, [GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00cf9200 } } }, + GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT #endif } }; EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(gdt_page); @@ -261,6 +263,7 @@ void load_percpu_segment(int cpu) loadsegment(gs, 0); wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, (unsigned long)per_cpu(irq_stack_union.gs_base, cpu)); #endif + load_stack_canary_segment(); } /* Current gdt points %fs at the "master" per-cpu area: after this, @@ -946,16 +949,21 @@ unsigned long kernel_eflags; */ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct orig_ist, orig_ist); -#else +#else /* x86_64 */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR +DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, stack_canary); +#endif -/* Make sure %fs is initialized properly in idle threads */ +/* Make sure %fs and %gs are initialized properly in idle threads */ struct pt_regs * __cpuinit idle_regs(struct pt_regs *regs) { memset(regs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs)); regs->fs = __KERNEL_PERCPU; + regs->gs = __KERNEL_STACK_CANARY; return regs; } -#endif +#endif /* x86_64 */ /* * cpu_init() initializes state that is per-CPU. Some data is already @@ -1120,9 +1128,6 @@ void __cpuinit cpu_init(void) __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS, &doublefault_tss); #endif - /* Clear %gs. */ - asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0)); - /* Clear all 6 debug registers: */ set_debugreg(0, 0); set_debugreg(0, 1); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S index 82e6868bee47..5f5bd22adcd4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ /*CFI_REL_OFFSET gs, PT_GS*/ .endm .macro SET_KERNEL_GS reg - xorl \reg, \reg + movl $(__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY), \reg movl \reg, %gs .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S index 24c0e5cd71e3..924e31615fb6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* Physical address */ #define pa(X) ((X) - __PAGE_OFFSET) @@ -437,8 +438,25 @@ is386: movl $2,%ecx # set MP movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %eax movl %eax,%fs # set this cpu's percpu - xorl %eax,%eax # Clear GS and LDT +#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + /* + * The linker can't handle this by relocation. Manually set + * base address in stack canary segment descriptor. + */ + cmpb $0,ready + jne 1f + movl $per_cpu__gdt_page,%eax + movl $per_cpu__stack_canary,%ecx + movw %cx, 8 * GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY + 2(%eax) + shrl $16, %ecx + movb %cl, 8 * GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY + 4(%eax) + movb %ch, 8 * GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY + 7(%eax) +1: +#endif + movl $(__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY),%eax movl %eax,%gs + + xorl %eax,%eax # Clear LDT lldt %ax cld # gcc2 wants the direction flag cleared at all times diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c index 86122fa2a1ba..9a62383e7c3c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ int kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags) regs.ds = __USER_DS; regs.es = __USER_DS; regs.fs = __KERNEL_PERCPU; + regs.gs = __KERNEL_STACK_CANARY; regs.orig_ax = -1; regs.ip = (unsigned long) kernel_thread_helper; regs.cs = __KERNEL_CS | get_kernel_rpl(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c index ef91747bbed5..d992e6cff730 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS # define DBG(x...) printk(KERN_DEBUG x) @@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void) per_cpu(this_cpu_off, cpu) = per_cpu_offset(cpu); per_cpu(cpu_number, cpu) = cpu; setup_percpu_segment(cpu); + setup_stack_canary_segment(cpu); /* * Copy data used in early init routines from the * initial arrays to the per cpu data areas. These diff --git a/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh b/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4fdf6ce1b062 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $1 -S -xc -c -O0 -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs" +if [ "$?" -eq "0" ] ; then + echo y +else + echo n +fi -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From ebd9026d9f8499abc60d82d949bd37f88fe34a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 12:17:29 +0100 Subject: stackprotector: fix multi-word cross-builds Stackprotector builds were failing if CROSS_COMPILER was more than a single world (such as when distcc was used) - because the check scripts used $1 instead of $*. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh | 2 +- scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'scripts') diff --git a/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh b/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh index 4fdf6ce1b062..29493dc4528d 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh +++ b/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #!/bin/sh -echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $1 -S -xc -c -O0 -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs" +echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $* -S -xc -c -O0 -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs" if [ "$?" -eq "0" ] ; then echo y else diff --git a/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh b/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh index 2d69fcdc5609..afaec618b395 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh +++ b/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #!/bin/sh -echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $1 -S -xc -c -O0 -mcmodel=kernel -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs" +echo "int foo(void) { char X[200]; return 3; }" | $* -S -xc -c -O0 -mcmodel=kernel -fstack-protector - -o - 2> /dev/null | grep -q "%gs" if [ "$?" -eq "0" ] ; then echo y else -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2