Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9843)

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index e9b467bd04..eff1121106 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -9,6 +9,18 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.2s and 1.0.2t [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt(). In situations
+     where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure
+     of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of
+     messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption
+     key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public
+     RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not
+     affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the
+     CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info
+     to decrypt.
+     (CVE-2019-1563)
+     [Bernd Edlinger]
+
    *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
       used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
       or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/